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Does Ownership Concentration Affect Engagement in Corporate Environmental 
Responsibility? The Mediating Role of Corporate Leverage 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of ownership concentration on engagement 
in corporate environmental responsibility (CER) in time and spatial dimensions. The 
time dimension focuses on the macroeconomic environment, in particular, periods of 
rapid and moderate-speed economic growth. The spatial dimension focuses on 
industry characteristics and different types of ownership (state or private). Further, it 
explores the mediating role of corporate leverage using panel regression models and 
stepwise regression with a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies over the 
period 2008-2016. The results show that ownership concentration has a significantly 
negative effect on CER. In addition, when we consider the macroeconomic growth 
rate, ownership type, and industry characteristics, the effect is heterogeneous. In 
periods with rapid economic growth, ownership concentration has a significantly 
negative effect on CER whereas it is not significant in a period with moderate 
economic growth. Further, the negative effect exists at state-owned and 
non-state-owned companies and at non-heavy-polluting industries. Corporate leverage 
has a partial mediating effect between ownership concentration and engagement in 
CER.  
 
Keywords: Corporate leverage; ngagement in corporate environmental 
responsibility; heterogeneous effect; ownership concentration  
JEL Classifications: G31, G38, M14. 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) has been widely 
discussed recently and has received a great deal of ttention from governments, 
shareholders, and the public. Both academic research rs and business managers have 
acknowledged the significance of CER activities (Broadstock et al., 2019; Chen et al., 
2019; Li et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2018; Su et al., 2020; Tapver, 2019; 
Trumpp and Guenther, 2017; Zhang, 2017). With the rapid development of the 
economy, enterprises tend to invest their capital in finance (Xu et al., 2020), so 
investment in the environment is easily crowded out. Although financial development 
can promote economic growth (Tripathy, 2019), this positive effect is not always 
produced (Matei, 2020). In particular, financial cycle spillover is subject to economic 
policy uncertainty, bilateral trade intensity, and capital flows (Liu et al., 2019). In 
evaluating the quality of economic development, enviro mental factors should be 
taken into account (Li and Li, 2020). Further, pressure from stakeholders has 








comprises corporate practices related to managing and using natural resources, 
production activities, disposing of waste, environmentally friendly products, recycling, 
and pollution prevention and control (Perrini, 2007). In other words, CER refers to the 
way in which companies undertake their responsibility to minimize and manage the 
negative impact of their operations and activities on the environment (Dummett, 2006; 
Li et al., 2020; Peng et al., 2018; Trumpp and Guenth r, 2017). Indeed, companies 
have crucial roles to play in environmental protection by undertaking environmental 
responsibility. Academics explain the connotation of CER from various perspectives, 
such as ethical perspective (Onkila, 2009), stakehold rs (Bansal and Roth, 2000), 
strategic management (Meng et al., 2019; Schaltegger and Wagner, 2011; Su et al., 
2020), environmental behavior (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008), financial performance 
(Dal Maso et al., 2018; Dang et al., 2019). These scholars argue that environmentally 
friendly products and using resources sustainably can reduce pollutants and improve 
the environment, which leads to sustainable development. CER engagement can 
coordinate the interests of stakeholders and improve companies' reputation as well as 
increase growth opportunities. It can also increase corporate green innovation (Hong 
et al., 2020) and reduce corporate risk (Li et al., 2017) and the cost of debt (Tseng et 
al., 2020; Xie et al., 2019) in the process of sustainable development through effective 
resource management. 
Ownership concentration is an important factor that influences companies in 
taking environmental responsibility. The goal of CER is to maximize the value of 
stakeholders, who are committed to achieving corporate sustainable development. In 
recent years, an increasing number of companies are taking the initiative to engage in 
CER. According to stakeholder theory, CER can build a good reputation among 
stakeholders, which not only increases firm value bt also is a competitive advantage 
in the market (Chen et al., 2019; Dal Maso et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019). At the same 
time, sustainable development prevents companies from alling into crisis because of 
environmental responsibility issues and reduces the pot ntial costs of environmental 
penalties (Henri et al., 2016). However, at listed Chinese companies a small number 
of shareholders hold most of the shares. According to agency theory, increasing 
ownership concentration can enhance the supervisory role of major shareholders in 
enterprise management (Burkart et al., 1997), which effectively limits managers' 
decisions and mitigates inefficient behavior within enterprises. However, 
concentration in equity is likely to trigger agency conflicts between major sharehlders 
and minor shareholders. Large shareholders have greater control over the company, 
and their predatory motivations are enhanced (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Large 
shareholders will make use of the control right to realize their own interests at the 
expense of the interests of minority shareholders. To maximize their own wealth, 
largest shareholders might think that CER is not conducive to corporate development 
because it increases firm costs and reduces firm profitability (Darnall and Edwards, 
2006). If companies spend a large amount of funds on taking more environmental 
responsibility, it might reduce their investment incore resources. Therefore, 
companies often spend as little as possible in meeting relevant CER requirements 








affects firm decisions about engaging in CER.  
A body of literature focuses on the influence of ownership structure on corporate 
social responsibility (Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Li and Zhang, 
2010), corporate social responsibility disclosure (Roberts, 1992; Tapver, 2019), and 
corporate social performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999). Li and Zhang (2010) use 
the CSR ranking of Chinese firms and find that, at non-state-owned enterprises, 
decentralization of corporate ownership is positively correlated with CSR. At 
state-owned enterprises, however, the relationship is reversed, because of political 
interference. Harjoto and Jo (2011) also find that, at US firms, CSR is positively 
related to governance characteristics such as board independence, institutional 
ownership, and analyst following. In addition, the research focuses on the relationship 
between mutual funds and CSR and finds that CSR friendly mutual funds improve 
CSR (Li et al., 2020). Some papers also indicate that ere should be a close 
relationship between ownership concentration and CER (Abeysekera and Fernando, 
2020; Erhemjamts and Huang, 2019; Walls et al., 2012), however, the relationship 
between them is controversial. Some authors believe that ownership concentration has 
a positive effect on CER. Liu et al. (2019) find that, at Chinese manufacturing 
enterprises, the ownership structure can improve environmental performance, due to 
the regulatory effect of financial performance. Other authors believe that ownership 
concentration is negatively correlated with CER. According to Calza et al. (2016), 
ownership structure matters in firms' environmental proactivity, and ownership 
concentration seems to be negatively related to having a proactive environmental 
strategy. A dispersion of ownership leads to an increase in the sensitivity of managers 
to environmental and social issues (Cox, Brammer, and Millington, 2004). Kuasirikun 
(2004) suggests that, even though large shareholders care about the environment, they 
do not always take into account their environmental responsibility. Therefore, 
companies with concentrated ownership pay less attention to environmental issues. 
Many papers analyze corporate social responsibility from the perspective of 
corporate management. Because CER is a single dimens on of corporate social 
responsibility, ownership concentration may have different effects on CER than on 
CSR. Because owners may have different objectives and decision-making horizons, it 
is worthwhile to study the relationship between ownership concentration and CER. To 
the best of our knowledge, in most cases corporate wnership is used as a moderating 
or mediating variable (Li et al., 2013; Meng et al., 2013), and no previous research 
focuses on ownership concentration at Chinese firms and CER engagement, 
particularly considering macroeconomic growth, ownership type, and industry 
characteristics. Moreover, there is a lack of existing research on the measurement of 
engagement in CER. Most studies have only established an analytical framework of 
CER at a theoretical level or rely on the evaluation of one case. This leads us to 
expect that ownership concentration might affect firms’ environmental policies. So, 
this paper raises the following questions. How does wnership concentration affect 
corporate decisions related to environmental responibilities? Is the effect of 
ownership concentration on CER engagement heterogene us when the time and 








have a mediating role in the relationship between ow ership concentration and CER 
engagement? 
This paper uses a sample of 4,968 observations fromChina A-share listed 
companies to create a comprehensive measurement of CER engagement as well as 
exploring the impact of ownership concentration on CER engagement.  
This paper makes four main contributions to the litera ure. First, we offer unique 
evidence on the relationship between ownership concentration and CER engagement 
that suggests a negative relationship between concentrat d ownership and CER 
engagement. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to highlight 
the heterogeneous effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement that 
considers the macroeconomic environment. Third, we explore the heterogeneity of the 
effect of ownership concentration and CER engagement by considering the spatial 
dimension, mainly focusing on different types of ownership and industry 
characteristics. Fourth, we examine the mediating role of the leverage ratio on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and CER engagement. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Following this introduction, in Section 2 
we construct the model and the measurement of CER engag ment and list the 
descriptive statistics; in addition, to confirm our results, we conduct robustness tests 
on the effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement. Section 3 shows the 
heterogeneous effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement, in which 
heterogeneity is addressed in three settings (macroeconomic environment, type of 
firm ownership, and industry characteristics). Section 4 shows the mediating role of 
the corporate leverage ratio on the relationship betwe n ownership concentration and 
CER engagement. In Section 5, we conclude the paper nd provide policy 
implications. 
 
2. Ownership Concentration and CER Engagement 
2.1 Panel Regression Model 
This paper argues that the effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement 
shows heterogeneity across companies and periods. In terms of the spatial dimension, 
companies have different internal characteristics, which lead them to have different 
levels of engagement in CER and result in heterogeneous effects of ownership 
concentration on CER. Companies have their own principal-agent problems. The 
supervisory and tunneling behaviors by large sharehold rs in corporate governance 
are heterogeneous across companies, which also implies heterogeneous environmental 
investment. Companies usually have diverse strategic targets in the process of daily 
operations and management, depending on their stageof d velopment and financial 
conditions. For instance, at the early stage, corporate development requires capital and 
large shareholders to pay more attention to financial variables. At the stage of maturity, 








desire a better corporate image. Further, in terms of the time dimension, depending on 
macroeconomic development as well as economic policies and laws, the government 
puts forward different requirements for corporate development, which will influence 
management decisions and corporate development programs. In this paper, we 
explore the effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement in both the spatial 
and time dimension using a panel regression model as follows: 
CERit=β0+β1OCIit+β2SIZEit+β3LEVit+β4FPit+industry+year+εit,      (1) 
where i represents a firm, and t represents the year. CER is the explained variable. 
OCI  is the explanatory variable representing ownership concentration. We also 
include some control variables: firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), and financial 
performance (FP). In addition, to mitigate the impact of firm heterogeneity and period 
characteristics on corporate R&D and innovation activities, we consider industry 
effects (industry) and year effects (year).  
 
2.2 Variable Measurement 
2.2.1 Dependent Variable: CER Engagement 
This paper measures CER engagement comprehensively with five dimensions: 
legal consciousness, social evaluation, ecofriendly production, low-carbon technology, 
and green management (Kim et al., 2017; Kolk, 2016; Li et al., 2020; Phiri et al., 
2019). We use the dimension on legal consciousness to examine whether companies 
have violated relevant laws and regulations. The social evaluation dimension is used 
to examine whether companies' environmental behaviors receive public praise and 
recognition. The ecofriendly production dimension identifies the production modes 
adopted by companies. The low-carbon technology dimension examines whether 
companies have achieved low-carbon technology while th  green management 
dimension explores whether environmental factors are considered in daily operations 
and management. Table 1 summarizes the specific dimensions, which focus on 
whether companies meet certain conditions. Thus, each indicator takes a value of 1 if 
the answer is yes, and 0 otherwise. Further, to ensur  that all indicators are in a 
consistent direction, companies that have received environmental penalties take a 
value of 0, and 1, otherwise. To ensure the objectivity of the results, all indicators 
have the same weight. Then we calculate the values for dimensions to obtain the CER 




k=1                         (2) 
where Iitk represents the indicator for firm i, year t, and dimension k. CERit is the 









Table 1. Measuring CER engagement 
Dimensions Indicator name 
I1: Legal consciousness 
1. Whether it follow the guide for sustainable development reporting 
from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
2. Whether it discloses environmental and sustainable development 
3. Whether it is subject to environmental penalties 
I2: Social evaluation 
1. Whether it received any environmental awards 
2. Whether it has other environmental advantages 
I3: Ecofriendly production 
1. Whether it adopts a circular economy 
2. Whether it engages in green production (measurement to decrease 
three wastes) 
I4: Low-carbon technology 
1. Whether it saves energy 
2. Whether it generates environmentally friendly products 
I5: Green management 
1. Whether it has been verified by a third party 
2. Whether its vision is related to environmental responsibility 
3. Whether it has an ISO 14001 certification 
4. Whether it uses green offices 
 
2.2.2 Explanatory and Control Variables 
Ownership concentration is usually measured by the ratio of the largest 
shareholders or the cumulative shareholding ratios of the top largest shareholders (top 
three, top five, or top ten, etc.). Accordingly, this paper uses the shareholding ratio of 
the largest shareholder (OCI) as a measurement of ownership concentration. In 
addition, we use the sum of the top five largest share olders as an alternative 
measurement for a robustness check. 
According to existing empirical results, company size is an important factor that 
influences CER engagement (Chen et al., 2020). Large companies have greater ability 
to perform corporate governance than small companies. Their business activities are 
relatively stable because of their abundant capital and human resources. Thus, large 
companies can engage in more CER (Meng et al., 2016; Ortas et al., 2015). They are 
inclined to take CER and disclose environmental information. The leverage ratio is a 
primary variable for measuring corporate solvency and debt risk. Companies with a 
higher leverage ratio usually have more risk. Further, companies with a high leverage 
ratio usually weaken their performance of environmetal responsibility as they view 
CER performance as a financial burden (Meng et al., 2016). 
Financial performance can be considered an economic condition for companies 
to engage in environmental responsibilities. Thus, low financial performance may 
reduce the companies' attention to environmental issue . Companies with good 
financial performance are more likely to engage more in environmental 
responsibilities (Chen and Hamilton, 2020; Ortas et al., 2015). Based on the relevant 
literature, we select three control variables: company size (SIZE), measured by the 
logarithm of total assets; leverage ratio (LEV), measured by the ratio between debt 










Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Full sample 
(N = 4,968) 
CER 4.8428 2.5963 1 12 
OCI 0.3895 0.1608 0.0894 0.7802 
OC5 0.5396 0.1664 0.1851 0.9196 
SIZE 9.9123 0.6235 8.6089 11.6225 
LEV 0.5140 0.1949 0.0795 0.9284 
FP 0.0471 0.0566 -0.1421 0.2342 
T1 (N = 
3,312) 
CER 4.3457 2.5771 1 12 
OCI 0.3958 0.1623 0.0923 0.7894 
SIZE 9.8158 0.6175 8.5317 11.5033 
LEV 0.5160 0.1921 0.0840 0.9458 
FP 0.0527 0.0586 -0.1358 0.2437 
T0 (N = 
1,656) 
CER 5.8370 2.3366 1 12 
OCI 0.3768 0.1568 0.0879 0.7482 
SIZE 10.1041 0.5931 8.9177 11.7713 
LEV 0.5100 0.2007 0.0711 0.8978 
FP 0.0358 0.0502 -0.1503 0.1805 
SOE (N = 
3,444) 
CER 5.0273 2.6048 1 12 
OCI 0.4191 0.1550 0.1072 0.7668 
SIZE 10.0209 0.6322 8.7657 11.7381 
LEV 0.5282 0.1923 0.0862 0.9269 
FP 0.0409 0.0537 -0.1522 0.2038 
NSOE (N = 
1,524) 
CER 4.4259 2.5284 1 12 
OCI 0.3222 0.1525 0.0745 0.7802 
SIZE 9.6682 0.5396 8.3676 11.0491 
LEV 0.4819 0.1973 0.0660 0.9416 
FP 0.0613 0.0607 -0.0912 0.2814 
IND0 (N = 
3,258) 
CER 4.6347 2.6121 1 12 
OCI 0.3785 0.1574 0.0923 0.7430 
SIZE 9.8784 0.6172 8.5574 11.5632 
LEV 0.5185 0.1954 0.0879 0.9306 
FP 0.0480 0.0531 -0.1294 0.2319 
IND1 (N = 
1,710) 
CER 5.2392 2.5193 1 12 
OCI 0.4107 0.1663 0.0807 0.8374 
SIZE 9.9788 0.6367 8.7673 11.8764 
LEV 0.5051 0.1943 0.0540 0.9248 
FP 0.0452 0.0629 -0.1662 0.2381 
Notes: T1 is a subsample for periods with a high economic growth rate while T0 is a subsample for periods with 
moderate economic growth rate. SOE = state-owned enterprises; NSOE = non-state-owned enterprises. IND0 is a 








2.2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This paper uses a sample consisting of China's A-share listed companies from 
2008 to 2016. The final sample for analysis consists of 522 companies with 4,968 
firm-year observations. We exclude financial companies and companies for which 
necessary data is missing for the variables used in our analysis. Financial data is 
collected from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
CER data come from both CSMAR and the China National Research Data Service 
(CNRDS) platform. After all the sample data are obtained, we winsorize all the 
continuous variables to eliminate the effect of any extreme values at the 1 percent 
level. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables. The minimum value of 
CER is 1 and the maximum is 12. The mean of CER is 4.8428, which suggests that the 
overall CER level is medium. The minimum ratio of the largest shareholder is 0.0894, 
and the maximum is 0.7802. The mean of the largest shareholder ratio is 0.3895, the 
minimum of the first five shareholders is 0.1851, and the maximum is 0.9196, with a 
mean of 0.5396. This shows the significant heterogeneity of ownership concentration 
at listed nonfinancial companies. Moreover, we also report descriptive statistics for 
six groups of subsamples—T1, T0, SOE, NSOE, IND0, and IND1, in which T1 and 
T0 are divided according to the macroeconomic growth rate, SOE and NSOE are 
divided according to corporate ownership, and IND0 and IND1 are divided according 
to their industry characteristics. 
Table 2 shows that the minimum and maximum of CER is the same in all 
subsamples, where the minimum is 1 and the maximum is 12. The differences 
between the minimum and maximum in ownership concentration are almost the same 
in the subsamples. However, both the minimum and maxi um values of ownership 
concentration show significant heterogeneity in the subsamples. The mean of CER is 
lower in the period with high economic growth than in the period with moderate 
economic growth, whereas ownership concentration is a l ttle higher in the period of 
high-speed economic growth than in the period of moderate economic growth. Both 
means of CER and ownership concentration are higher at SOEs than at non-SOEs. 
Also, the means of CER and ownership concentration are both higher in heavily 
polluting industries than at non–heavily polluting i dustries. 
 
2.3 Empirical Results 
To explore the effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement, we used 
OLS to estimate the model parameters. CER is influeced by many factors, and 
variables might be omitted in this paper. In addition, a reverse causal relationship 
might exist between ownership concentration and CER, as enterprises can enhance 
their value and reputation through engaging in CER, which might attract some owners 








of variables lead to endogeneity in the model. To mitigate the endogeneity in the 
model, we use a panel model with fixed effects as arobustness test. At the same time, 
we use a first-order lagged term for ownership concentration as an instrumental 
variable. Then, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation and the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) to estimate the parameters and to reduce endogeneity 
problems. In addition, we use the top five shareholders as an alternative proxy for 
ownership concentration. The results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 shows that the coefficient of ownership concentration in model (1) is 
−0.754 (p < 0.01). The sum of the shareholding ratio of the top five shareholders is 
used as a measurement of ownership concentration in model (2). Model (3) uses a 
panel regression model with fixed effects. Model (4) uses the 2SLS method while 
model (5) uses GMM. The signs of the parameter estimates are all consistent with 
those in model (1), but with a small difference in absolute values and significance 
levels. This shows the robustness of the parameter estimate. The empirical results 
show that all the regression coefficients of ownership concentration exceed the 
significance level of 5 percent, regardless of the explanatory variable or the 
alternative estimate method. The effect of ownership concentration on CER is 
negative, which suggests that large shareholders do not pay sufficient attention to 
CER engagement. High ownership concentration impedes CER engagement.  
As China is an emerging market, stocks are mostly held by minority shareholders. 
The conflict between large shareholders and small sh reholders dominates the main 
agency problem. To maximize their interests, large shareholders often ignore the 
rights and interests of other stakeholders. Moreover, minority shareholders in China 
generally have a free-rider mentality, which weakens their oversight of large 
shareholders and corporate executives. China began to require listed companies to 
disclose social responsibility information in 2008, but it has not yet formed a mature 
regulatory system and a good evaluation system. Because of concentrated ownership, 
the supervisory role of major shareholders on enterprise managers is enhanced 
(Claessens et al., 2000). However, because of the weak awareness of environmental 
protection among major shareholders and their encroachment on the interests of 
minority shareholders, shareholders are often unwilli g to invest their funds in 
environmental protection. Corporate governance is affected by product market 
competition (Giroud and Mueller, 2011), and product market competition also affects 
shareholder decisions about fulfilling enterprises’ environmental responsibility (Meng 
et al., 2016). The competitive environment often reduces the cash flow of enterprises, 
so that enterprises have a negative profit outlook. What is more, some enterprises are 
affected by excess competition, so they face default risk. With limited resources and 
maximization of shareholders' wealth, major shareholders choose production and 
operations that can bring direct benefits, while ignoring their fulfillment of 
environmental responsibilities. With regard to the control variables, all the 
coefficients of company size are significantly positive, which confirms that large 
companies are inclined to undertake CER. The coeffici nts of firm leverage ratios are 
significantly negative, at a significance level of 1 percent, suggesting that the leverage 








3. Heterogeneous Effect of Ownership Concentration on CER 
3.1 Ownership Nature, Industry Characteristics, and Macroeconomic Environment 
Although we have found that ownership concentration has a significantly 
negative effect on CER engagement, we cannot ignore the heterogeneous effects 
when considering different companies and different macroeconomic environments. 
The macroeconomic environment, industry characteristics, and corporate ownership 
are important factors that influence CER engagement. First, in China's capital market, 
the percentage of large shareholders is usually high. Large shareholders achieve their 
profits through tunneling behaviors. From the microperspective of China’s new 
normal economy, companies are required to optimize their ownership structure and 
address the imbalance from excessive ownership concentration and then formulate 
rational corporate governance structures and support the transformation of economic 
development. In addition, for political and economic reasons, local governments often 
take action on environmental protection but pursue GDP unilaterally (Du, 2015), 
which results in severe environmental problems. In its new normal economy, China 
has played an important role in reducing pollution through economic restructuring and 
economic slowdown (Zheng et al., 2019). The economic deceleration means paying 
more attention to the quality of economic development and requiring companies that 
are heavily polluting to transform and upgrade. Unlike in high-speed development, 
after economic deceleration, decreased industrial production reduces pollutant 
emissions and improves environmental quality. This provides the external conditions 
for companies to engage in CER. Furthermore, the new ormal economy requires 
companies to strengthen their awareness of environmental protection, which also 
drives companies to undertake their environmental responsibilities. Second, 
companies' attention to CER is heterogeneous when t characteristics of different 
types of companies or industry are considered (Zeng t al., 2012). Corporate 
production and operations in different industries show significant differences in how 
they affect the environment, which leads to different stakeholder expectations and 
different levels of media attention. Thus, the effect of ownership concentration on 
CER engagement may be influenced by industry characteristics. Production by 
heavily polluting companies is considered a serious problem that affects the 
environment. Companies are required to deal with the pollutants created by 
production. Otherwise, any environmental problem will have a negative impact on 
their reputation, stock prices, company value, and so forth. Further, non–heavily 
polluting companies are subject to tighter regulations by the government, which can 
force them to engage in CER and disclose information n environmental 
responsibility. At the same time, investors and financial institutions are paying greater 
attention to CER performed by heavily polluting companies when they are assessing 
corporate risk and the firms’ capacity for sustainable development. Thus, heavily 
polluting companies are more willing to perform their environmental responsibilities 








The type of ownership is also an important factor that influences CER 
engagement. The dominant stockholder at SOEs is the gov rnment. This particularity 
means that SOEs have to pay more attention to environmental responsibility (Zeng et 
al., 2012). SOEs are charged with maximizing the public interest when pursuing their 
economic interests. The government requires SOEs to actively undertake 
environmental responsibilities in order to offer good models and spread positive 
effects. In addition, SOEs can take advantage of bank loans and that means they face 
fewer financing constraints. They can also take advantage of adequate capital and 
human resources, which enable them to perform theirenvironmental responsibilities 
well. However, non-SOEs are more sensitive to the cost of meeting their 
environmental responsibilities as they face more financing constraints. Accordingly, 
the effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement is heterogeneous when 
different types of corporate ownership are considere . 
 
Table 3. Regression results for ownership concentration and CER 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable OLS OLS FE 2SLS GMM 
OCI -0.754***  -0.903*** -0.763*** -0.763*** 
 
(0.208)  (0.204) (0.230) (0.230) 
OC5  -0.648***    
  (0.209)    
SIZE 1.734*** 1.741*** 1.759*** 1.838*** 1.838*** 
 
(0.0623) (0.0638) (0.0609) (0.0653) (0.0653) 
LEV -1.105*** -1.093*** -1.579*** -1.290*** -1.290*** 
 
(0.211) (0.210) (0.201) (0.222) (0.222) 
FP -0.294 -0.174 -0.834 -1.211* -1.211* 
 
(0.614) (0.615) (0.547) (0.653) (0.653) 
Constant -13.11*** -13.17***  -11.86*** -11.86*** 
 
(0.566) (0.569)  (0.626) (0.626) 
individual   Yes   
industry Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,968 4,968 4,968 4,416 4,416 
R-squared 0.315 0.314  0.291 0.291 
Number of d 552 552 552 552 552 
F-statistic 101.24 100.64    









3.2 Empirical Results 
Based on the theoretical analysis above, we divide the sample according to the 
macroeconomic growth rate, industry characteristics, and type of corporate ownership. 
We regard the new normal in the Chinese economy as an exogenous event and 
consider 2008-2013 a period of rapid economic growth and 2014-2016 a period of 
moderate economic growth. With respect to industry characteristics, the sample is 
divided into two groups: heavily polluting industries and non–heavily polluting 
industries. According to the guidelines on industry classification for listed companies 
revised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2012, heavily polluting 
industries comprise 16 categories, and non–heavily polluting industries comprise the 
remainder. As to the type of corporate ownership, the sample is divided into two 
groups: SOEs and non-SOEs. 
 




Rapid economic growth Moderate 
economic growth 
OCI -1.009*** -0.228 
 
(0.253) (0.366) 
SIZE 1.806*** 1.542*** 
 
(0.0761) (0.109) 
LEV -1.349*** -0.512 
 
(0.261) (0.363) 
FP -0.00524 -0.938 
 
(0.734) (1.136) 
Constant -13.85*** -9.023*** 
 
(0.695) (1.017) 
industry Yes Yes 
year Yes Yes 
Observations 3,312 1,656 
R-squared 0.296 0.186 
F-statistic 80.72 21.60 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***  < 0.01, **   < 0.05, *  < 0.1. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of parameter estimates for rapid and moderate rates of 
economic growth. The effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement is 
heterogeneous for economic growth rates. In rapid economic growth, the coefficient 
of ownership concentration is -1.009 with a significance level of 1 percent. In 
moderate economic growth, the coefficient of ownership concentration is -0.228, but 
it is not significant. In periods of rapid economic growth, economic activities have 
frequently caused great environmental damage. Meanwhile, CER engagement in 








mature. Considering the high cost of environmental protection and the fact that 
corporate performance through undertaking CER cannot be enhanced quickly, 
companies usually ignore their CER when pursuing economic interests. Ownership 
concentration significantly restrains CER engagement in periods of rapid economic 
growth. However, no evidence has been found on the eff ct of ownership 
concentration on CER engagement in periods of moderate conomic growth. 
Table 4 also shows that economic growth makes a difference in the effect of 
ownership concentration on CER engagement. Accordingly, we add it to the 
regression for the subsamples distinguished by their ype of ownership and industry 
characteristics. 
Further, Table 5 reports the parameter estimates of the effect of ownership 
concentration on CER engagement for different types of ownership and different 
industry types. The results show that the coefficient of ownership concentration is not 
significant in periods of moderate economic growth. However, with respect to the 
effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement in periods of rapid economic 
growth when the type of ownership is considered, the coefficient of ownership 
concentration at SOEs and non-SOEs are –0.951 and –1.135, respectively, which are 
both significant at 5 percent. Ownership concentration restrains CER engagement at 
non-SOEs more than at SOEs, although ownership concentration is higher at SOEs 
than at non-SOEs. Thus, SOEs are not only economic entities but also political 
entities. This requires SOEs to coordinate the public interest, environmental interests, 
and economic interest, rather than only maximizing profit. Thus, SOEs usually pay 
sufficient attention to and actively undertake their nvironmental responsibilities. 
Further, when considering the type of industry, the coefficients of ownership 
concentration in heavily polluting industries are –0.581 and –1.330, respectively, but 
not significant; however, it is significant in non–heavily polluting industries with 
rapid economic growth. Production by non–heavily polluting industries does less 
damage to the environment than production by heavily po luting industries, resulting 
in weaker oversight. In general, CER engagement depends on corporate initiative. 
However, because of the high ownership concentration and tunneling behaviors by 
large shareholders, companies are unwilling to undertak  more CER while they are 
pursuing their economic interests. Thus, ownership concentration significantly 
restrains CER engagement by non–heavily polluting industries. 
 
4. The Mediating Effect between Ownership Concentration and CER 
Engagement 
4.1 Mediating Effects Model 
The relationship between ownership concentration and CER may be influenced 








determined by the controlling power of shareholders (Schmid, 2013). Large 
shareholders usually prefer debt financing, rather an equity financing, in order to 
protect their controlling power and maintain oversight of corporate governance. In 
addition, corporate development and capital accumulation benefit from management 
of debt from external financing sources. Therefore, with high ownership concentration, 
large shareholders can abuse debt capital in their own interest, increasing the 
corporate leverage ratio. At the same time, the levrage ratio is an important indicator 
in measuring the ability to repay debt and the corporate debt risk. A high leverage 
ratio presents a high corporate risk and might expose firms to high bankruptcy costs. 
In addition, an excessive asset-liability ratio greatly reduces the external credit 
evaluation for those companies, which may cause financial distress. Shareholders with 
higher controlling power might be inclined to reduce orporate liabilities and 
corporate risk and avoid creditor checks (Lee and Kuo, 2014). 
Thus, a high ownership concentration means a low leverage ratio. In addition, Lo 
et al. (2016) confirm a U-shaped relationship betwen ownership concentration and 
the leverage ratio. More concretely, if ownership concentration is low, shareholders 
can strengthen their controlling power through corporate liabilities. The corporate 
leverage ratio increases with increases in ownership concentration. After ownership 
concentration reaches its maximum, bankruptcy risk exceeds the return on leverage, 
and shareholders avoid financial distress and bankruptcy risk by reducing corporate 
liabilities. Conversely, the leverage ratio decreases with an increase in ownership 
concentration. 
The leverage ratio is also an important factor in influencing CER engagement. 
On the one hand, according to contract theory, companies are accountable not only to 
shareholders but also to creditors. Companies are inclined to undertake more environ- 
mental responsibilities if they are accompanied by a high debt ratio, in order to justify 
the legitimacy of their operations to creditors. Meanwhile, creditors are increasingly 
demanding that companies disclose environmental information. Thus companies with 
higher leverage ratios are inclined to take their environmental responsibilities (Ortas 
et al., 2015). On the other hand, higher debt ratios mean higher principal and interest 
payments, which more easily lead to a debt crisis, re ulting in earning fluctuation. 
Thus, a higher corporate debt ratio means a greater rnings fluctuation and higher 
corporate risk. CER engagement is costly; moreover, th  benefits of this engagement 
cannot be achieved in a short time without uncertainty. Therefore, companies with 
high leverage ratios perform their minimum environmental responsibilities to avoid 
adding to their financial burden. 
Accordingly, the leverage ratio might play a mediating role between ownership 
concentration and CER engagement, which we examine with a stepwise regression in 
this paper. First, we test the total effect of ownership concentration on CER with 
model (3), which does not include a mediating variable. Second, we identify the effect 
of ownership concentration on the mediating variable, namely, the leverage ratio, by 
setting the mediating variable as an explained variable and ownership concentration 








of the leverage ratio between ownership concentration and CER engagement by 
adding the mediating variable to model (3), written as (1). Models (3) and (4) are as 
follows: 
CERit=θ0+θ1OCIit+θ2SIZEit+θ3FPit+industry+year+εit,        (3) 
LEVit=θ0+θ1OCIit+θ2SIZEit+θ3FPit+industry+year+εit,        (4) 
where i  means the company and t  means the year. If the coefficient θ1  is 
significant, then we examine the mediating effect. If he coefficients θ1, , and  
are all significant, this suggests that the effect is one of partial mediation. If both  
and  are significant but  is not, then the mediating effect is complete. If both 
 and  are insignificant, then a mediating effect is absent. If neither  nor  
is significant, then further examination is needed. 
 
Table 5. Heterogeneity in the effects of ownership concentration on CER 





























OCI -0.951*** 0.0384 -1.135** -0.665 -1.330*** -0.653 -0.581 1.318 
 
(0.319) (0.446) (0.477) (0.758) (0.307) (0.468) (0.459) (0.609) 
SIZE 1.812*** 1.467*** 1.695*** 1.643*** 1.806*** 1.765*** 1.763*** 1.056*** 
 
(0.0860) (0.120) (0.166) (0.275) (0.0973) (0.147) (0.121) (0.158) 
LEV -1.362*** -0.333 -0.456 -0.724 -1.241*** -0.676 -1.704*** 0.00216 
 
(0.321) (0.416) (0.418) (0.735) (0.319) (0.502) (0.45 ) (0.509) 
FP 0.0870 -0.280 -0.194 -1.470 1.171 -3.021* -2.389* 1.882 
 
(0.923) (1.326) (1.279) (2.277) (0.858) (1.674) (1.362) (1.574) 
Constant -13.71*** -8.823*** -12.80*** -9.819*** -13.83*** - 10.83*** -12.92*** -5.367*** 
 
(0.794) (1.151) (1.478) (2.497) (0.864) (1.347) (1.098) (1.470) 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,302 1,142 1,010 514 2,172 1,086 1,140 570 
R-squared 0.302 0.197 0.288 0.189 0.314 0.217 0.239 0.130 








4.2 Empirical Results 
The macroeconomic growth rate is included in the regression analysis, followed 
by an examination of the influencing mechanism betwe n ownership concentration 
and CER engagement. The full sample is divided into tw  groups: the first group is 
for the period of rapid economic growth, and the second is for the period of moderate 
economic growth. 
 
Table 6. Regression results of intermediate effect 
 Rapid economic growth Moderate economic growth 
Variable CER LEV CER LEV 
OC1 -0.928*** -0.0604*** -0.220 -0.0154 
 
(0.253) (0.0166) (0.366) (0.0237) 
SIZE 1.647*** 0.118*** 1.463*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.0695) (0.00517) (0.0955) (0.00688) 
FP 1.771*** -1.316*** -0.0872 -1.661*** 
 
(0.634) (0.0594) (1.001) (0.0835) 
Constant -13.07*** -0.578*** -8.522*** -0.979*** 
 
(0.678) (0.0535) (0.952) (0.0752) 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,312 3,312 1,656 1,656 
R-squared 0.290 0.438 0.185 0.501 
F-statistic 81.22 136.76 22.37 132.86 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***  < 0.01, **   < 0.05, *  < 0.1. 
 
Table 6 reports the parameter estimates from the stepwise regression model. The 
coefficient  is –0.928, at the 1 percent significance level, suggesting that we can 
further examine the mediating effect. In rapid economic growth, the coefficients are 
 = −0.0604,  = −1.009, and  = −1.349, all at the 1 percent significance 
level, suggesting the existence of a partial mediating effect of the leverage ratio 
between ownership concentration and CER. Table 4 show  a significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and CER engagement, with the total effect 
measured as –0.928, which reflects that the structure of concentrated ownership is not 
conducive to stimulating companies to engage in their environmental responsibilities. 
The direct effect of ownership concentration on CER is –1.009, which implies that the 
mediating effect of the leverage ratio is measured as (–0.0604)×(–1.349) = 0.081 or –
0.928 – (–1.009) = 0.081. The leverage ratio shows a positive mediating effect 
between ownership concentration and CER, which reduc s the negative effect of 
ownership concentration on CER. Indeed, shareholders pay great attention to 
corporate financial indicators. Shareholders' decision behavior depends on the 








the tunneling motivations of large shareholders butalso their supervision over 
administrators, which helps shareholders to make efficient decisions. Large 
shareholders are conscious of high-risk levels as companies are subject to high 
leverage ratios. To avoid creditor checks and a decline in credit ratings, companies 
undertake their environmental responsibilities to demonstrate the legitimacy of their 
operations. Thus, the leverage ratio may reduce the in ibiting effect of the 
concentrated ownership structure on CER engagement. With moderate economic 
growth,  is –0.0154 and  is –0.220, and both are insignificant, suggesting he 
absence of a mediating effect. In summary, the leverage ratio plays a mediating role 
between ownership concentration and CER engagement in periods of rapid economic 
growth. 
 
5. Conclusion and Practical Implications 
This paper examines the effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement 
considering the time and spatial dimensions of this relationship. In this investigation, 
the time dimension mainly focuses on the macroeconomic environment, in particular, 
periods of rapid and moderate economic growth, and the spatial dimension mainly 
focuses on looking at different types of ownership and industry characteristics. 
Further, this paper explores the mediating role of c rporate leverage on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and CER engagement at Chinese 
A-share listed companies over the period 2008-2016.  
The results show that ownership concentration has a significant negative effect 
on CER engagement for two reasons. First, large shareholders are unwilling to invest 
more in environmental protection because of their lower environmental awareness and 
tunneling motivations induced by having a concentrated ownership structure. Second, 
because of the absence of laws and regulations as well as a lack of proper supervision, 
CER has no hard constraints. Overall, concentrated ownership is not conducive to 
CER engagement. Shareholders are inclined to pursue economic interests, rather than 
balancing economic interests and environmental activities. Further, the effect of 
ownership concentration on CER engagement is heterogeneous across 
macroeconomic growth rates, type of ownership, and i ustry characteristics. 
Ownership concentration has a significant inhibiting effect on CER engagement 
during periods of rapid economic growth, but not in periods of moderate economic 
growth. In periods of rapid economic growth, companies should earn more profit. 
Large shareholders focus on tunneling behaviors and are more unwilling to assume 
their environmental responsibility in this period. Thus, concentrated ownership 
significantly inhibits CER engagement. In periods of moderate economic growth, the 
strong motivations of large shareholders pursuing their own interests may be weaker. 
Shareholders at some companies might plan to contribute to environmental protection 
and sustainable development. Concentrated ownership might not have significant 








Second, the inhibiting effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement 
exists at both SOEs and non-SOEs but is stronger in non-SOEs. Environmental 
awareness among shareholders is lower at non-SOEs than a  SOEs. At foreign-owned 
companies in particular, large shareholders care most about their own interests and 
usually meet lower environmental standards or even evade environmental regulations 
to reduce their costs. Thus, as large shareholders at non-SOEs, especially at 
foreign-owned companies, have less environmental awareness, ownership 
concentration has a more significantly inhibiting effect on CER engagement at 
non-SOEs than SOEs. Ownership concentration has a significant inhibiting effect on 
CER engagement in industries that are not heavily po luting. However, we find no 
evidence on the relationship between ownership concentration and CER engagement 
at firms in heavily polluting industries, some of which have environmental problems 
due to severe pollution. This forces their large share olders to pay more attention to 
their environmental responsibilities. Thus, the inhibiting effect of ownership 
concentration on CER engagement is not significant, u like in non–heavily polluting 
industries. 
The results also show that the corporate leverage rtio has a partial mediating 
effect on the relationship between ownership concentration and CER engagement. In 
addition, it is heterogeneous across macroeconomic environments, in particular, rapid 
and moderate economic growth. A high leverage ratio means high corporate risk. 
Large shareholders have to demonstrate the legitimacy of their operations by 
undertaking environmental responsibilities and engaging in more CER. Thus, the 
leverage ratio weakens the inhibiting effect of ownership concentration on CER 
engagement. Moreover, the leverage ratio shows a significant partial mediating effect 
between ownership concentration and CER in periods of rapid economic growth, but 
not in periods of moderate economic growth. 
This paper makes three main contributions. First, this paper provides unique 
evidence on the relationship between ownership concentration and CER engagement, 
suggesting that concentrated ownership is negatively related to CER engagement. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to highlight the 
heterogeneous effect of ownership concentration on CER engagement that considers 
the macroeconomic environment. Third, this paper explores the heterogeneity of the 
effect of ownership concentration and CER engagement by considering the spatial 
dimension, mainly looking at different types of ownership and industry characteristics. 
Fourth, this paper provides unique evidence on the mediating role of the leverage ratio 
on the relationship between ownership concentration on CER engagement. 
The findings in this paper have important policy implications for the government, 
shareholders, decision makers, suppliers, and credito s. For instance, the government 
should establish an effective mechanism for balancing the ownership structure to 
protect the benefits of small investors and weaken th  tunneling behaviors of large 
shareholders. Ownership concentration should be considered a dimension when 
assessing the environmental effect of foreign direct investment in the future. 








improve their system of environmental oversight. Further, shareholders should 
strengthen their environmental awareness and make sustainable decisions through full 
use of their controlling powers, driving coordination between economic interests and 
CER engagement and sustainable development. Also, the government should be 
aware of the fact that rapid economic growth greatly ffects the environment. Thus, it 
should proceed with supply-side reform, develop a high-quality economy, and adapt 
to the new normal economy. The government could provide enterprises with 
subsidized green loans to reduce their energy-related emissions and raise 
environmental quality (Huang et al., 2019; Li et al., 2018). When designing various 
policies related to CER engagement, policy-makers should consider the heterogeneity 
in the type of ownership and industry characteristics. In particular, more attention 
should be given to non–heavily polluting industries and non-SOEs. Suppliers and 
creditors should raise their awareness of corporate environmental protection and 
corporate sustainability and require companies to engage in CER and disclose more 
environmental information. All stakeholders should make an effort to achieve 
sustainable development.  
Our study has some limitations, which present possible starting points for future 
research. First, this paper measures CER based on the scores of corporate social 
responsibility in reports disclosed by listed companies. Because the reports are 
compiled by enterprises themselves, it is doubtful that they reflect their fulfillment of 
environmental responsibility truthfully. Further research could identify indicators that 
reflect the level of environmental responsibility fulfilled by enterprises more 
accurately, so that it can draw better-grounded conclusions. In addition, this paper 
does not consider the impact of product market competition on shareholders' 
propensity for fulfilling their environmental responsibility. Future studies could 
examine the influence of ownership concentration on CER based on different degrees 
of product market competition. 
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